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RECENT DECISIONS
of the statute, it is necessary to present the facts to the court so as
to enable it to pass upon the reasonableness of the groupings. 6
While the presumption is that the statute enacted by the legislature is valid, 7 yet, a complaint, based upon the alleged unconstitutionality of that statute, should not be dismissed without a hearing
of the evidence for otherwise the right of the people to guard against
8
an infringement of their rights would be seriously impaired.
V. A. P.

EVIDENCE-ADMISSION OF JUDGMENT ROLL OF CIVIL ACTION

TRIAL.-The defendant was convicted of extortion.'
At the trial the defendant claimed that the complaining witnesses
were acting in bad faith and were motivated by a desire to punish
the defendant for his part in obtaining a contract from the said complaining witnesses for a labor union. To rebut and partially discredit this position of the defendant, the state introduced the judgment roll in a prior civil action upon labor union contracts wherein
the said contracts were held unenforceable because they had been
obtained by duress practiced by this defendant's union. 2 It was not
IN CRIMINAL

state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence
of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed. One

who assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing
that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary."
Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U. S. 342, 36 Sup. Ct. 370 (1916);
Tanner v. Little, 240 U. S. 369, 36 Sup. Ct. 379 (1916); Radice v. People of
State of N. Y., 264 U. S. 292, 44 Sup. Ct. 325 (1924); Clark v. Deckeback,
274 U. S. 392, 47 Sup. Ct. 630 (1927); Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 281 U. S.
146, 50 Sup. Ct. 310 (1930); State Board of Tax Commissioners v. Jackson,
283 U. S. 527, 51 Sup. Ct. 540 (1931); Smith v. Calhoon, 283 U. S. 553, 51
Sup. Ct. 582 (1931).
8
Southern Railway Co. v. Greene, 216 U. S.400, 30 Sup. Ct. 287 (1910);
Air-way Electric Appliance Corp. v. Day, 286 U. S.71, 45 Sup. Ct. 12 (1924);
Concordia Fire Ins. Co. v. Illinois, 292 U. S. 535, 54 Sup. Ct. 830 (1934).
'Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., supra note 5; Hammond v.
Schappi Bus Line, supra note 3; O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Ins.
Co., 282 U. S.251, 51 Sup. Ct. 130 (1931).
1 Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, Hammond v. Schappi Bus Line, Inc., both
supra note 3; Equity Rule 7032 (28 U. S. C. A. §723).
IN. Y. PENAL LAW (1909) §850.
2The material and relevant portions of the judgment roll are:
EIGHTH: That the said instrument was extorted from the defendants by the plaintiff and others acting on behalf of the plaintiff, by
duress and coercion in so threatening the ruin of the defendant's business, in consequence of which and in fear and apprehension thereof, the
defendant, Kleen Laundry Service, Inc., signed and executed the instrument.
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revealed on the trial that the judgment in the civil case had been
reversed. Held, that admission of the judgment roll was unduly
prejudicial to the defendant's rights and the conviction must therefore be reversed. People v. Rosenzweig, 265 N. Y. 323, 193 N. E.
161 (1934).
The essential obstacle to the use of the judgment roll as evidence was the fact that this court was of the opinion that it would
be difficult for the jury to distinguish between the contracts referred
to in the judgment roll and the contract in the instant case. "The
fact that the judgment of the court was in a civil action, while their
judgment was called for in a criminal action would make no difference to a jury, whatever the difference might be to a lawyer." 3
While the court conceded that it might have been proper to place
before the jury the fact that the Supreme Court in a civil action had
held these contracts void, 4 nevertheless, to permit the introduction
of the entire judgment roll was error.5
The law aids juries to arrive at verdicts by the means of presumptions and inferences. 6 In civil cases, all presumptions are binding upon the jury, unless disproved. 7 On the other hand, in criminal trials, all presumptions, except three,8 are dissolved into inferNINTH:

That the Union agreement is harsh, unfair, unconscion-

able, and impossible of performance, and so detrimental to the corporate
defendant that to perform it would mean great loss to the defendant

corporation and ruination of its business.
' Instant case at 330, 193 N. E. at 163.
'"We

think the people, in view of the evidence introduced by the defendant

regarding the 1934 contract, were justified in showing that, in a Supreme Court
action, those contracts had been rendered null 'and void or set aside; * *
Ibid.
8"*
* *; but we think that it was going entirely too far to show that the
judge had made findings in a decision showing threats and coercion by the
defendant's union in procuring those contracts." Ibid.
' A presumption is defined as a rule of law that courts and judges shall
draw a particular inference from a particular fact or from particular evidence,
unless the truth of such inference is disproved. United States v. Sykes, 58
Fed. 1000 (1893) ; Ulrich v. Ulrich, 136 N. Y. 120, 32 N. E. 606 (1892);
Brandt v. Morning Journal Ass'n, 81 App. Div. 183, 80 N. Y. Supp. 1002 (1st
Dept. 1903).
An inference has been defined as a deduction based upon facts proved
which the jury may, or may not, make as it sees fit according to its own
conclusions. Cross v. Passumpsic Fiber Leather Co., 90 Vt. 397, 98 Atl. 1010
(1916); Chambers v. Hunt, 18 N. J. Law (3 Har.) 339 (1841).
' See definition of presumption, sunpra note 6.
8 Those presumptions which do not dissolve into inferences are those of:
Innocence: N. Y. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1881) §389; People v.
American Ice Co., 120 N. Y. Supp. 443 (1909); People v. Nileman, 8 N. Y.
St. 300 (1887) ; People v. Baker, 96.N. Y. 340 (1884) ; People v. Dixon, 2 Abb.
Pr. 395, 4 Park. Cr. 651 (1856) ; People v. Thayer, 1 Park. Cr. 595 (1825).
Sanity: Davis v. United States, 160 U. S. 469, 16 Sup. Ct. 353 (1895);
O'Connell v. People, 87 N. Y. 377 (1882); Williams v. State, 13 Ala. App.
133, 133 So. 376 (1915); Bell v. State, 120 Ark. 530, 180 S. W. 186 (1915);
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ences.9

An inference, however, is not a conclusion which the jury

must reach. 10 But since an inference must be based on a proved
fact," it cannot be the foundation of another inference.' 2 The admission of the judgment roll in this case would allow the jury to base
an inference upon an inference. 13

J. A. R.,

JR.

HoMTCIDE-UNcoRRoBoRATED DYING DECLARATION OF VICTIM
OF DEFENDANT.-The appellant was convicted of
-IDENTIFICATION

murder in the first degree. Deceased was shot from behind and
no one testified to any act on the part of deceased indicating that
he turned around or saw his assailant. Appellant was not connected
with the crime by eye witnesses. The only evidence offered which
might tend to show that appellant was the man who did the shooting
was a dying declaration.- Held, reversed, the dying declaration is
insufficient to support a conviction where other evidence of the identity of the murderer is unsatisfactory. People v. Ludkowitz, 266

N. Y. 233,

N. E.

(1935).

People v. Loomis, 170 Cal. 347, 149 Pac. 581 (1915); Pribble v. People, 49
Colo. 210, 112 Pac. 220 (1910); State v. Curtin, 28 Dela. 518, 95 Atl. 232
(1914); Johnson v. State, 57 Fla. 18, 49 So. 40 (1909); State v. Wetter, 11
Idaho 433, 83 Pac. 341 (1905) ; People v. Spencer, 264 Ill. 124, 106 N. E. 219
(1914) ; State v. Thomas, 172 Iowa 485, 154 N. W. 768 (1915) ; Ford v. State,
73 Miss. 734, 19 So. 665 (1896); State v. Hill, 65 N. J. Law 626, 47 AtI. 814
(1901) ; Maas v. Territory, 10 Okla. 714, 63 Pac. 960 (1901) ; King v. State,
91 Tenn. 617, 20 S. W. 169 (1892); State v. Mewhinney, 43 Utah 135, 134
Pac. 632 (1913) ; State v. Harris, 74 Wash. 60, 132 Pac. 735 (1913) ; State v.
Pressler, 16 Wyo. 214, 92 Pac. 806 (1907); McNaughten's Case, 1 C. & K.
130, Note a (1843).
Knowledge of the Law, Brunaugh v. State, 173 Ind. 483, 90 N. E. 1019
(1910); State v. Jones, 118 La. 369, 42 So. 967 (1907); Crain v. State, 69
Tex. Cr. 55, 153 S. W. 155 (1913); Taff v. State, 69 Tex. Cr. 528, 155 S. W.
214 (1913).
oSince the defendant has the benefit of the presumption of innocence, the
court cannot compel the jury to find any fact detrimental to the defendant.
10 Supra note 7, definition of inference.
n Ibid.
"Every inference must be based upon some fact or facts which have
already been proved; it may not be based upon another inference. Lamb v.
Union Ry. Co., 195 N. Y. 260, 88 N. E. 371 (1909) ; Warner v. New York, 0.
& W. Ry., 209 App. Div. 211, 204 N. Y. Supp. 607 (4th Dept. 1924) ; Plotnick
v. Plotnick, 185 App. Div. 15, 172 N. Y. Supp. 584 (lst Dept. 1918).
"Using the judgment roll the jury could infer that this contract was
unenforceable and, with this as a basis, they could infer that it was secured by
the same means; and further, that since this defendant was the agent for the
Union for procuring the contracts he was the party who exercised the coercion
and uttered the threats.
'Made in response to questions written on a regulation police blank.

